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Abstract 
Democratic accountability requires that citizens can assign responsibility for policy outcomes, yet 
multilevel structures of government complicate this task as they blur lines of accountability and 
leave voters uncertain about which level of government is responsible. This study examines the 
extent to which Europeans are able to navigate the complex and ever-changing divisions of 
responsibility between their national governments and the European Union (EU). Specifically, we 
compare citizen and expert responsibility attributions to evaluate if and how voters can 
competently assign policy responsibility to the European Union. Using multilevel modeling to 
analyze survey and media data from 27 EU member states, we demonstrate that extreme attitudes 
decrease citizen competence by motivating biased information processing. Yet at the contextual 
level, highly politicized environments result in more correct allocations of responsibility by 
creating an information-rich context.  
 
Keywords: multilevel governance, attribution, responsibility, polarization, knowledge, European 
Union 
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 Lack of political knowledge among citizens is well-documented (see e.g. Converse 1964; 
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Indeed, the level of citizen ignorance about politics have led some 
scholars to suggest that “the low level of political knowledge and the absence of ideological 
reasoning have lent credence to the charge that popular control of the government is illusory” 
(Iyengar 1987, 816). Citizens living in systems of multi-level governance, such as the European 
Union (EU), face a greater challenge when it comes to holding their representatives to account, 
since they have the additional task of differentiating between multiple levels of government when 
deciding whom to credit and blame for policy outcomes (Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2004, 2008; de 
Vries et al. 2011; Johns 2011). Yet, if popular control is to be more than an illusion, then it is 
crucial that citizens have at least a basic understanding of the different levels of government 
responsibility and are able to assess their government’s performance. The very notion of elections 
as a means of holding governments to account assumes that citizens are able assign responsibility 
for policy outcomes (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981; Rudolph 2003). Since attribution of responsibility is 
not a matter of preferences or policy positions, citizens cannot easily rely on proxies or shortcuts 
to help them distinguish governmental responsibility (Lupia 1994; Sniderman 2000). This raises 
the question of whether citizens are able to correctly differentiate responsibility between levels of 
national and supranational government. More fundamentally, it begs the question of what factors 
enable citizens to acquire the information necessary to do so.  
This article examines individuals’ ability to attribute policy responsibility to the European 
Union. To be able to assess the degree of competence in citizens’ responsibility judgments, we 
compare citizen evaluations to expert judgments. The theoretical framework highlights the key 
factors at both the individual and the contextual level that enable individuals to distinguish 
between the responsibilities of different levels of government. Specifically, we theorize that 
learning about governmental responsibility will depend on three key elements: individual-level 
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knowledge and political attitudes, as well as an information-rich political environment. Previous 
studies of how citizens cope with multilevel governance systems have only examined single 
countries, such as the US, Canada, or Spain. Given the multi-national and multi-level nature of the 
EU, it provides an ideal test case not only for expanding the research utilizing a more complex 
system, but also for explicitly testing contextual level variables that single-country studies can 
only speculate about. Specifically, it provides an ideal situation for examining both how 
individual-level factors and very different political contexts shape citizens’ ability to assign 
responsibility, and for comparing these effects across twenty-seven different countries. 
 This study thus contributes to the literature in three important ways. First, we examine 
attribution of responsibility in the context of the EU utilizing three unique cross-national datasets: 
a survey of citizens in all 27 EU member states, a study of the media contexts, and a survey of 
experts in EU policy making. Second, our findings, based on multilevel analysis of these data, 
show that even within the EU there are significant differences in the information provided by the 
political environment, and these, in turn, shape citizens’ ability to assign responsibility. Finally, 
we demonstrate that while political attitudes may serve as a motivating factor, they do not increase 
voter competence, since citizens with strong attitudes are more likely to be biased information 
processors as a result of motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990). These findings have important 
implications for our understanding of citizen competence and democracy in complex systems. 
 
Attributing Responsibility in Multilevel Government Systems 
 In the classic tradition of democratic theory, elections are a sanctioning device in which 
voters reward or punish incumbents on the basis of past performance (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966). 
This model of the electoral process relies on the critical assumption that voters are able to assign 
responsibility for policy outcomes. Responsibility judgments are thus the principal mechanism by 
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which citizens hold representatives to account for their actions, since it is those judgments that 
intervene between evaluations of policy outcomes and voting behavior. For a number of reasons, 
multiple levels of government make it more difficult for individuals to correctly assign 
responsibility (Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2004, 2008; Johns 2011; León 2011). When policy 
responsibilities are divided between multiple levels of government, and often overlapping, citizens 
may not know which level of government is more responsible for a particular policy. In addition, 
politicians do not have incentives to make the system more clear. Complexity allows them to claim 
credit for successful policies and engage in blame shifting for undesirable outcomes. 
 Developments in the economic voting literature have illustrated the importance of 
attribution of responsibility as a moderator of voting behavior. According to the simple reward-
punishment model, individuals vote for the incumbent when the economy is good and for the 
opponent when times are bad (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988). However, this model has been 
shown to work best in countries where responsibility lies with a single government party, and less 
well when governments are weak and divided and legislatures are strong (Powell and Whitten 
1993; Anderson 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002; Whitten and Palmer 1999). Most of these aggregate-
level studies have focused on “horizontal” institutional structures, such as coalition and divided 
government, and they have not directly examined voters’ views of who is responsible. 
Recently more attention has turned to the “vertical” institutional structures of federal 
government, mainly in the context of the federal systems of Canada and the US (Arceneaux 2006; 
Gomez and Wilson 2003; Cutler 2004, 2008; Johns 2011). Collectively, this work has sought to 
understand to what extent 1) citizens attribute different amounts of responsibility to different 
levels of government; 2) these attributions are correct; and 3) voters cast their ballot based on these 
perceptions of responsibility and assignment of credit or blame. Yet, the studies provide mixed 
evidence about the ability of citizens to allocate responsibilities among different levels of 
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government. Some studies suggest that citizens are able to hold elected representatives to account 
for their performance at the more appropriate level of government (Atkeson and Partin 1995), 
whereas others suggest that citizens have difficulty distinguishing between different levels and do 
not differentiate responsibility (Cutler 2008) and that even when they are able to correctly 
distinguish it is unclear if this translates into greater accountability (Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2004; 
Johns 2011; Hobolt and Tilley 2014). This work thus leaves open the question of the degree to 
which citizens are able to correctly assign responsibility to different levels of government in a 
multilevel system, and more importantly what enables them to do so. 
First we must define “responsibility” and “correct” responsibility assignments. In the 
context of multilevel government, “responsibility” has been considered primarily in two ways: 
functional responsibility and causal responsibility (see Hart 1968). Functional responsibility refers 
to the role and tasks for which the government is responsible, in other words, the areas where it 
has policy-making duties. For example, the EU can be said to have functional responsible for 
monetary policy in the Eurozone. Causal responsibility refers to the influence an actor has on 
bringing about a specific outcome, which can lead to attributions of credit for positive outcomes 
and blame for negative results. In this article, we focus on functional responsibility and analyze if 
and how individuals understand the EU responsibility for various policy areas. We do not assess 
perceptions of whether the EU has had a positive or a negative influence on policy outcomes.  
Specifically, we are interested in assessing the degree of competence in citizens’ 
responsibility evaluations. But how do we know when citizens are making “correct” attributions of 
responsibility? The literature on voting behavior defines competent voting as voters choosing the 
same way as they would have done if perfect information were available (see Lupia 1994; Lau and 
Redlawsk 1997). Similarly, we define competent attribution of responsibility as individual 
assessments that are similar to those that would have been made with perfect information. The best 
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way of measuring “perfect information” is to obtain expert opinions on actual divisions of 
responsibility in the EU.  Similar to the approach used by Cutler (2008), who conducted an expert 
survey on federal versus provincial responsibility in the Canadian context, we have conducted a 
survey of scholars specializing in European Union policy-making and averaged across expert 
evaluations to establish a baseline assessment of EU responsibility. By comparing citizen 
evaluations of responsibility to expert judgments, we can determine how close citizen evaluations 
are to fully-informed assessments. The next section presents our theoretical propositions about 
when and why individuals are capable of reaching attribution judgments of expert quality. 
 
Ability and Motivated Reasoning 
 There is no doubt that it is difficult for individuals to attribute responsibility in federal or 
multilevel government systems, as extant work has shown. However, this prior work lacks a 
theory to explain when and why individuals are able to attribute responsibility in systems of 
multilevel governance. To address this question, we build on previous research which argues that 
knowledge about political issues is a function of ability, motivation, and opportunity (Luskin 
1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gordon and Segura 1997). Individuals vary considerably in 
their cognitive ability to understand political information, their motivation to seek it out, and the 
opportunities they have to obtain this knowledge. This past research highlights the role that 
motivating factors play in encouraging citizens to seek out information, finding that the intrinsic 
factor of political interest is positively correlated with political knowledge. We go beyond 
motivating factors to explore the role of motivated reasoning: how do political attitudes influence 
information processing? Thus we do not ask if citizens are motivated by their political attitudes, 
but how are they motivated to process EU-related information. We theorize that cognitive ability 
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facilitates, while political attitudes motivate information processing about the EU’s 
responsibilities. This will be expanded in the ensuing sections. 
 
Responsibility Judgments Facilitated by Cognitive Ability 
 Some individuals have a higher cognitive ability, which manifests itself in higher levels of 
political sophistication and facilitates the consumption and systematic processing of complex 
political information (Luskin 1990). Indeed, high knowledge citizens are better able to understand 
institutional complexity and divided lines of responsibility. Highly sophisticated voters are more 
capable of recognizing that responsibility is divided among multiple levels and of making diffuse 
responsibility attributions, whereas low sophisticates generally focus on one political actor (Cutler 
2004; Gomez and Wilson 2003, 2008). High sophisticates are also more competent in processing 
political information and news stories, and in converting this information into stored knowledge 
(Zaller 1991). Moreover, an individual’s level of general political knowledge is a reliable predictor 
of news story recall (Price and Zaller 1993). Some individuals are generally interested in and more 
knowledgeable about a variety of political topics. In addition, highly informed citizens are more 
likely to perceive objective facts (Blais 2010). As political sophisticates are better able to 
understand complex government structures, divided responsibility, and have the cognitive ability 
to process and retain political news, we expect high political sophisticates to also be more 
knowledgeable about the European Union’s responsibility. This brings us to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Political sophisticates will make more correct responsibility assignments. 
 
Responsibility Judgments Motivated by Political Attitudes 
 Even if we do expect individuals with higher levels of political sophistication to more 
correctly allocate responsibility, it is generally costly and thus irrational for most citizens to be 
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politically informed (Downs 1957). Indeed, we would not expect individuals of similar cognitive 
ability to be equally competent at assigning responsibility because of differing motivations. While 
individual cognitive ability facilitates information processing, political attitudes motivate 
information processing. Previous studies have identified motivating factors that generate more 
competent behavior and higher levels of knowledge (Luskin 1990; Eveland 2004). However, 
following the literature on motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990; Taber et al. 2009), we argue that 
political attitudes motivate individuals to process information in a very different way, resulting 
instead in less competent behavior. People hold a variety of politically-related attitudes, some of 
them strong and stable, others are weak and variable. We focus on the impact of strong political 
attitudes because they are more likely to bias information processing and judgments, as well as 
influence behavior, than weak attitudes (Krosnick and Petty 2005). There are multiple dimensions 
of attitude strength including attitude extremity and ambivalence. Attitude extremity is defined as 
the deviation from the midpoint on a scale (Abelson 1995), with individuals consistently holding 
mostly positive or negative views towards the same attitude object. Ambivalence occurs when an 
individual holds a mixture of favorable and unfavorable views, and is measured by the sum of 
positive and negative evaluations (Thompson et al. 1995).  
Both attitude extremity and ambivalence influence information processing: individuals 
with extreme attitudes are more often motivated by directional goals, whereas ambivalent citizens 
are motivated by accuracy goals. Citizens with strong prior attitudes are often biased information 
processors, motivated by (dis)confirmation biases (Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber et al. 2009). 
These individuals are more likely to discount information that is contrary to their prior beliefs, and 
indiscriminately accept information that is in line with their attitudes. They may also actively seek 
out information that confirms their prior attitudes. This is well-established in the literature on 
voting behavior. Over fifty years ago, Campbell et al. (1960) asserted that individuals are prone to 
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interpret political items through a partisan bias, in other words, that political attitudes distort 
information processing. This has been confirmed in many studies since then (Redlawsk 2002; 
Bartels 2002). An individual’s political beliefs affect the way they engage in political decision-
making and information processing (Rahn 1993; Bartels 2000). Partisan predispositions affect 
perceptions of the economy (Evans and Anderson 2006; Gerber and Huber 2010) and attributions 
of responsibility (Tilley and Hobolt 2011; Rudolph 2003, 2006). While different terminology for 
attitudes has been used in these various studies (partisanship, affect, predispositions, attachment, 
stereotypes, etc.) the findings are very consistent: strong attitudes bias perceptions and beliefs. 
 Conversely, individuals with high levels of ambivalence are more likely to process 
information in a systematic way (Rudolph and Popp 2007; Lavine et al. 2012). There is evidence 
of the “greater aptitude of ambivalent citizens as compared to non-ambivalent citizens to make 
more balanced or accurate political judgments” (Meffert et al. 2004, 64). When individuals 
undertake reasoning driven by accuracy goals, they spend more time and effort in evaluating the 
information and are much less reliant on several types of bias and heuristic shortcuts (cf. Kunda 
1990). Individuals who engage in a search for information with the goal of forming accurate 
impressions are much more likely to report correct information or impressions than individuals 
who do not have an accuracy goal (Huang and Price 2001; Biesanz and Human 2010).  
Recent research suggests that EU attitudes are often ambivalent (de Vries and Steenbergen 
2013; Stoeckel 2013). Both extreme and ambivalent attitudes towards the European Union can 
motivate knowledge acquisition, but while individuals with extreme pro- or anti-EU attitudes may 
be motivated to learn about EU-related information, we also expect that they are more likely to 
select information that is in line with their prior beliefs and to process new information in a biased 
manner. This will result in a less accurate understanding of the EU’s policy-making role. 
Ambivalent individuals, and those without strong predispositions for or against the European 
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Union, whom we refer to as “centrists”, are more likely to process information in a non-biased 
way and thus better able to allocate responsibility. Centrists is a diverse group that can include 
people who are ambivalent about the EU or who have moderate views on European integration. 
For this research, the heterogeneity of this group is not a concern as the theoretical focus is 
individuals with extreme attitudes compared to those with moderate attitudes.  
H2: Individuals with extreme positive or negative attitudes about European 
integration are less able to correctly assign responsibility compared to centrists. 
 
Contextual Information and the Politicization of European Integration 
 Moving beyond determinants at the individual level, we now turn to the role of the 
information context. Citizens do not acquire information in a vacuum; they are affected by the type 
of information available in the environment and the saliency of a given issue. The political context 
can motivate, provide information, and help even low informed citizens to gain knowledge 
(Kuklinski et al. 2001). Previous studies have shown that the knowledge gap between low and 
high sophisticates can shrink when more information is provided in the political context 
(Nicholson 2003; Jerit and Barabas 2006). But what type of political environment provides the 
opportunity to acquire information about complex structures of governance and motivates citizens 
to pay attention to this information? 
We argue that the politicization of the European issue plays an important role in 
determining the availability of information about and saliency of the EU to individual citizens. 
Recent work on political behavior in Europe has argued that the issue of European integration is 
becoming increasingly politicized as we are witnessing public contention over European matters in 
referendums, party competition and media reporting (de Vreese 2003; Tillman 2004; de Vries 
2007; Kriesi et al. 2008; Hobolt 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2009). EU politicization refers to the 
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increasing contentiousness of decision making in the process of European integration (Schmitter 
1969). Hooghe and Marks posit that this politicization has changed both the content and the 
process of decision making in the EU (2009, 8). Importantly, however, the level of politicization 
of European issues varies considerably across countries. We know from studies of vote choice in 
referendums and elections that arena-specific voting - so-called “EU issue voting” - is more 
pronounced when the European issue is politicized in the domestic sphere (Tillman 2004; de Vries 
2007; Hobolt 2009; de Vries et al. 2011). Equally, we would expect that the level of politicization 
of the EU issue in a country affects citizens’ knowledge about EU policy responsibility by 
increasing the amount of information available about the EU and making it a salient issue. In turn, 
this creates an opportunity for all in that country to acquire this information. 
It is important to note that a lack of politicization in the field of EU studies has been 
associated with elite (and media) consensus in favor of European integration, and generally little 
public debate (Hooghe et al. 2002; Hobolt et al. 2009). Consequently, politicization mostly implies 
that actors more critical of the EU are given a voice, creating debate and increasing the amount of 
negativity surrounding European integration. We therefore focus on two key indicators of 
politicization: the negativity of media coverage of the European Union and perceived party 
polarization on the EU issue. Firstly, learning can occur in negative media contexts through two 
mechanisms: by the increased availability and attention to information, and by increasing the 
salience of the issue. Studies have uncovered a negativity bias whereby negative information 
stands out above positive information (Rozin and Royzman 2001). One reason for this is that 
negative stories are more likely to capture an individual’s attention through physiological arousal. 
Negative arousal in particular is associated with retaining more information (Reeves et al. 1991; 
Lang et al. 1996). As individuals pay the most attention to negative stories, we expect that the EU 
becomes salient in countries with more negative coverage of EU news.  
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Second, we would expect the EU to be salient in contexts where parties are polarized on 
the European integration dimension. Issue salience increases when political parties are polarized 
on an issue and salience decreases when parties’ stances converge (Milazzo et al. 2012). In 
contexts where parties’ positions on European integration are polarized, the EU becomes a more 
salient topic and there are higher levels of EU-related information available than in contexts with 
little party polarization. We theorize that politicized contexts provide an opportunity to learn from 
the information-rich environment and individuals are motivated to do so because of the perceived 
salience of the topic.  
H3: The more negative the media tone is on stories about the European Union, the 
more correctly individuals will attribute responsibility. 
H4: Individuals in contexts where parties are polarized along the European 
dimension will more correctly allocate responsibility. 
 
Data 
 To test our hypotheses, we rely on three separate datasets: the 2009 European Election 
Study Voter Survey (EES 2009; van Egmond et al. 2009) which included a module of 
responsibility questions, the EES Media Study (Schuck et al. 2010) and a survey of experts on EU 
policy making conducted by the authors. The voter survey was fielded during the four weeks 
immediately following the June 2009 European Parliament elections, with randomly-drawn 
samples of at least 1,000 respondents in each of the EU’s 27 Member States. The Media Study 
includes content analysis of news stories from two broadsheets and one tabloid as well as the main 
evening news broadcasts from each EU country. In total, 52,009 television and newspaper stories 
were coded. Finally, to ascertain “correct” evaluations of EU responsibility, we surveyed experts 
on European Union policy making.2 One hundred seventy-five potential expert respondents were 
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invited to complete the survey, which included the same responsibility questions as in the EES 
voter survey. A total of 117 individuals responded (67% response rate), with at least two experts 
per EU Member State. The goal was not to obtain a perfect distribution across countries, in 
particular since EU experts are not represented equally throughout the Member States, but rather 
to have enough variation to average expert evaluations of European Union policy responsibility.3  
The question modules on attributions of responsibility probed respondents for their 
responsibility judgments in five policy areas, using the following wording:4 
 How responsible is the (country) government for economic conditions in 
(country)? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means “no responsibility” and 10 means “full responsibility.”  
 And what about the European Union, how responsible is the EU for 
economic conditions in (country)? 
These questions were repeated for the following policy areas: standard of health care, levels of 
immigration, setting interest rates and dealing with climate change.  
 Table 1 provides a summary of expert and citizen attributions of functional responsibility 
to national governments and the EU across five policy areas. Table 1 gives the mean and standard 
deviation for each group. Note that citizens and experts are further divided into Eurozone/non-
Eurozone groups for the interest rate questions: citizens in Eurozone countries are compared to 
experts in Eurozone countries, while individuals in non-Eurozone countries are evaluated against 
experts in non-Eurozone countries. To assess the extent to which citizens assign responsibility 
correctly, we compare the scores given by individuals in our voter survey with the scores of 
experts. It is noteworthy that citizens and experts rank order the responsibility of the EU across 
policy areas similarly, with EU assigned the highest level of responsibility for interest rates 
(within the Eurozone) and the lowest responsibility for health care. On average, however, citizens 
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attribute higher levels of responsibility to the EU than do experts in all areas except one: Eurozone 
citizens attribute less responsibility than the experts do to the EU for interest rates. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The standard deviations are generally much smaller for the experts, showing that while 
there is some variation in expert opinion, there is less disagreement among experts than there is 
among citizens. We turn now to the multivariate analysis of the individual-level and contextual-
level factors to test our hypotheses about the role of ability, motivation, and politicization in 
correctly allocating responsibility to the European Union. 
 
Methodology 
 To assess correct attribution of responsibility we construct a measure of closeness to the 
expert evaluation.  We first calculated the mean expert attribution of responsibility for each issue 
area.5 Next, we subtracted an individual’s attribution of responsibility from the expert mean and 
took the absolute value to find the distance from expert evaluation. Finally, we averaged across the 
five policy areas to create the outcome variable of closeness to expert evaluation. Note that 
attributions to national governments and to the EU are included in the outcome variable. As these 
questions were asked sequentially and are inherently linked, both should be considered.6 Similar to 
how a multi-item scale can correct for measurement error, by averaging across all policy areas, we 
obtain a more accurate picture of individual’s general understanding of EU responsibility.  
 The individual-level model estimates the importance of ability and attitudes in making 
competent responsibility judgments. To test the hypotheses that cognitive ability facilitates correct 
responsibility attributions, political knowledge is included as an explanatory variable. Political 
knowledge is a summated scale created from factual political knowledge questions (Zaller 1992).7 
To assess politically motivated evaluations, we include EU attitudes; a standardized summated 
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rating scale, with positive values being most supportive of the European Union.8 Importantly, 
since we do not anticipate that there is a linear relationship between EU attitudes and 
responsibility judgments, we also include EU attitudes squared to capture the curvilinear effect. In 
addition, we include age, gender, occupation, and education as control variables as these have been 
associated with political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Luskin 1990). 
 To test our hypotheses on the direct effects of politicization of the EU issue, two 
contextual-level variables are included. The first, negative media tone, is a measure of the tone of 
news stories about EU- topics in television broadcasts and newspapers.9 Higher values of this 
variable correspond to more negative tone in the media on EU issues. Second, party polarization is 
a measure of the political party system on the issue of European integration. Since we argue that 
polarization increases saliency and the amount of information available, it is crucial that voters 
perceive party differences. Therefore, this measure uses citizens’ subjective placement of the 
parties in the EES voter survey and is calculated as the standard deviation of the mean party 
positions in each political system.10 Finally, we control for length of EU membership. 
 Multilevel analysis is used to model both the individual-level and contextual-level 
variation in closeness to expert evaluations. A multilevel, or hierarchical, model allows for 
estimating the variance between individuals as well as the variance between countries to 
specifically correct for the clustered nature of the data and to obtain correct standard errors 
(Snijders and Bosker 1999).  
 
Results 
 The model estimation results are shown in Table 2. The first column shows the random 
effects ANOVA, or null model, which allows us to partition the variance between the individual-
level and country-level. Based on the variance estimates, the intra-class correlation is measured at 
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.10, meaning that 10% of the variation in correct attributions of responsibility is due to between-
country differences, while 90% is due to individual-level differences. This is in line with the cross-
level variation found in other comparative studies of attitudes in Europe (such as Crepaz and 
Damron 2008; McLaren 2007). The second column provides the results for a baseline model 
including only the substantive variables, and the final column includes the control measures. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 At the individual level, we proposed that cognitive ability would facilitate while EU 
attitudes would motivate information processing. First, we theorized that citizens with high levels 
of political knowledge are generally more aware of and able to process political topics and would 
therefore make attributions closer to expert evaluations. We find this hypothesis is supported: 
political knowledge is strongly associated with correct responsibility attributions.11 For a one-unit 
increase in political knowledge, a respondent will be .06 points closer to expert evaluations, 
holding all other variables constant. The most politically sophisticated individuals will be, on 
average, .42 points closer to expert judgments. This finding is not surprising, but it could not be 
assumed. Citizens usually have limited knowledge about EU governance, so it is important to 
confirm that cognitive ability, measured by political sophistication, facilitates correct attributions 
of responsibility. 
 For the second individual-level covariate, we examine how political attitudes motivate 
information processing. We theorized that individuals with extreme attitudes – strong EU 
supporters and Euroskeptics – may select and process EU-related information in a biased way. 
Therefore, they will make responsibility judgments that are less accurate. On the other hand, 
individuals with centrist or ambivalent attitudes towards the EU are much less likely to suffer form 
a perceptual bias and therefore are better able to acquire factual content about the European Union. 
This hypothesis was strongly supported: both Euroskeptics and EU supporters make less accurate 
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responsibility judgments than do the people with centrist attitudes. This is demonstrated in Figure 
1, which shows the predicted responsibility judgments across levels of EU attitudes and the 
associated 95% confidence intervals, holding all other variables at their mean. The figure clearly 
shows a curvilinear relationship between EU attitudes and correct assignment of responsibility. 
The most Euroskeptic individuals are a full point less accurate than centrists, while EU supporters 
are .4 points less accurate than those individuals with moderate or ambivalent EU attitudes. While 
individuals with extreme attitudes on both ends of the spectrum suffer from biased information 
processing, the effect is stronger for those with negative attitudes.12 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 At the country-level, we proposed that politicization creates an opportunity for citizens to 
learn from the information-rich environment, resulting in more correct assignments of 
responsibility across levels of government. In contexts where the EU is highly politicized, the 
European issue becomes more salient and more accessible for people to learn about it. We tested 
this theory with two different contextual-level variables: negative media tone and party 
polarization. We find support for the direct effects of media negativity. The EU issue is more 
salient to individuals in countries where the news stories about the EU are primarily negative, 
enabling citizens to make more accurate responsibility judgments. Austria, Flemish Belgium, and 
the United Kingdom had the media outlets with the most negative tone, while Malta and Bulgaria 
had the most positive media tone. Austrians were .5 points closer to expert evaluations than 
Maltese respondents, holding all other effects constant.  
 Similarly, there are strong direct effects of party polarization on attributions of 
responsibility. In countries where political parties are perceived to be highly polarized on the EU-
issue, such as Sweden and Luxembourg, individuals make more accurate responsibility 
evaluations than those in countries where polarization is perceived lowest, including Estonia and 
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Latvia.13 Holding all other variables constant, citizens in the most polarized context are .59 points 
closer to experts than citizens in the least polarized country. The politicization indicators of media 
tone and party polarization both support the theory that increased politicization creates an 
environment where individuals have access to information and improves correct attributions of 
responsibility. This suggests that while both predictors are measures of politicization and have 
similar effects on correct attributions of responsibility, they are tapping into slightly different 
processes. This is supported by their low correlation (.16), and lends further credence to the claim 
that politicization, in various forms, increases the amount of information available to citizens.14 
 
Conclusion 
 Citizens generally are uninformed about political affairs and are lacking in political 
knowledge. It is especially difficult for them to understand allocations of responsibility in complex 
institutional structures. Indeed, some scholars have argued that it is irrational for voters to spend 
the necessary time and energy to become well-informed about politics. Yet it is crucial for 
democratic accountability that citizens have at least a basic understanding of governmental 
responsibility. To that end, this article sought to answer if European citizens can competently 
allocate responsibility to the European Union. In addition, if becoming informed is costly, under 
what conditions can citizens make responsibility judgments that approach expert quality?  
The empirical analysis provided support for our theoretical model which highlighted 
cognitive ability, political attitudes, and politicization of the European issue as key factors in 
allocations of responsibility to the EU. At the individual level, we posited that cognitive ability 
facilitates the acquisition and consumption of information, with high political sophisticates more 
likely to correctly allocate responsibility than their less sophisticated counterparts. Moreover, 
while attitudes towards European integration may motivate individuals to acquire information, 
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attitude extremity promotes biased information processing which leads to less accurate 
responsibility judgments compared to those with ambivalent or moderate attitudes. This was 
demonstrated with a curvilinear relationship between EU attitudes and correct attributions of 
responsibility. At the contextual level, we theorized that politicization on the European issue 
would provide an opportunity to easily acquire information about the EU through increased 
salience and amount of information available. We demonstrated that two different types of 
politicization resulted in more correct responsibility attributions: negative media tone on EU 
stories and party polarization on European integration.  
 These findings have important implications for our understanding of what enables 
individuals to learn about complex political matters. While cognitive ability is important, it is only 
one factor that facilitates political learning; attitudes and the political context are also crucial. 
Extreme political attitudes as well as greater politicization can make the issue salient and motivate 
individuals to seek out information. However, because they are liable to suffer from 
(dis)confirmation biases which influence their information processing, individuals with extreme 
attitudes are the least likely to make correct responsibility judgments.  
  Yet the story is reversed when we move from the individual to the contextual level. In the 
political context, higher levels of politicization result in increased information supply and more 
accurate political judgments. This greater amount of available information is accessible for 
anyone, so no matter how moderate or extreme an individual’s attitudes are, he is more likely to 
form accurate impressions than a citizen with similar attitudes in a context with low levels of 
politicization. This is reassuring news for those who worry about increasing political 
contentiousness and the potential negative impacts on democratic outcomes. In the context of the 
European Union, we find that increased politicization improves citizens’ knowledge of complex 
governance structures, which can positively influence democratic accountability and governance.  
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Endnotes  
                                                 
 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Marie Curie Initial Training 
Network in Electoral Democracy (ELECDEM), FP7-PEOPLE and from the Economic Social and 
Research Council (RES-062-23-1622). An online appendix containing supplemental information 
for this article is available at http://journals.cambridge.org/jop. Data and supporting materials 
necessary to reproduce the numerical results will be available at www.hobolt.com upon 
publication. 
2 The expert survey was carried out online in February 2010 (after the EES voter survey in June 
2009, but before the onset of the Eurozone crisis with the first bailout of Greece in May 2010 and 
the Irish bailout in November 2010). Most names obtained from UACES Expert on Europe. 
3 While there is an objective reality of EU responsibility for policy areas and outcomes, there is no 
straightforward single measure that can be applied. Therefore, we use experts’ attribution of 
responsibility as a measure of this latent variable. We believe this is the best method to establish a 
baseline of divisions of responsibility in a governance structure as complex as the EU. Other 
studies have demonstrated the validity and reliability of expert judgments when measuring similar 
political constructs such as party and policy positions in comparative politics (see e.g. Steenbergen 
and Marks 2007; Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010). Furthermore, experts, while highly sophisticated, 
are not merely “high sophisticate” citizens. They possess specialized knowledge that, when 
averaged across experts, enables estimation of a “true” allocation of responsibility. 
4 A possible critique is that these questions do not specify which institution within the EU – 
European Parliament, Commission, Central Bank, etc. - is responsible. However, most citizens 
tend not distinguish between the myriad of European institutions (Karp et al. 2003) and rather 
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consider the EU as an entity so the lack of institutional-specification should not pose a problem 
when measuring citizen perceptions of EU responsibility. 
5 While there was less variation in the experts’ attributions of responsibility than the citizens’ 
attributions, the experts were not in complete agreement. To ensure the robustness of the findings, 
we also calculated the dependent variable using 1) separately, the lower and upper bounds of the 
expert confidence interval as the mean expert scores and 2) distance between citizens and their 
country experts (i.e. a citizen from the UK is compared to the UK experts). The substantive 
conclusions remain the same. 
6 Results are the same when the dependent variable includes only attributions to the EU, and when 
the dependent variable is the relative responsibility of the EU compared to national governments. 
These model estimations can be found in the online appendix. 
7 Question wording given in the online appendix. The scale has an alpha score of .67.   
8 EU attitudes measure is a standardized item scale created from four equally weighted questions 
with an alpha score of .71. See the online appendix for question wording. These items were chosen 
for the scale of EU attitudes as they were highly correlated with each other and meet the monotone 
homogeneity assumption in item-rest tests. In addition, we model it as a one-dimensional 
construct, as we found strong unidimensionality in the responses.  
9 This measure is based on coding of how news stories evaluated the EU, the European Parliament, 
and enlargement: negative, rather negative, balanced/mixed, rather positive, positive.   
10 Our findings are robust when we instead use the range of the parties’ positions in each system 
with the EES data. 
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11 The EES survey included questions about the EU and national governments. In models testing 
the EU and national knowledge items separately, both had a strong and significant positive 
association with correct responsibility attributions.  
12 It is worth noting that these effects are not driven by a propensity of EU supporters (skeptics) to 
simply assign more (less) responsibility to the EU. The correlation between EU support and 
assignment of responsibility to the EU, averaged across five policy areas, is only 0.03. We find, 
however, that the effect of attitude bias on assignment of responsibility is conditioned by 
perceived performance in a policy area, e.g. when the economy is improving, EU supporters 
attribute more responsibility to the EU, whereas Euroskeptics attribute more responsibility to the 
EU when the economy is perceived to be deteriorating (see also Hobolt and Tilley 2014). 
13 An alternative measure of EU politicization could be the incidence of holding referendums on 
European integration. When included as a second-level variable instead of EU party polarization, 
this has a strong and significant relationship with attributions: citizens in countries who have had 
an EU referendum are closer to the expert judgments. However, this measure is highly correlated 
with party polarization at .51. Since the direction of causality is unclear – referendums could lead 
to party polarization or vice versa – we have chosen to focus on party polarization. 
14 These substantive interpretations are from the baseline model. When controlling for membership 
length, comparing the most and least politicized contexts, the effect of media tone is .37 and party 
polarization is .47. A citizen in a founding member country is, on average, .27 points closer to the 
experts than citizens who joined the EU in 2007. 
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Tables & Figures 
Table 1: Comparing Expert and Citizen Attributions of Responsibility* 
  Experts     Citizens   
Policy Area Mean  (SD)    Mean (SD)   
National Government 
Responsibility 
     Economy 5.88  (1.84)   7.19 (2.72)   
Health Care 8.13  (1.77) 
 
7.80 (2.70) 
 Immigration 6.69  (2.09) 
 
7.23 (2.81) 
 Interest Rates - Non 
Eurozone 4.53  (3.35) 
 
6.80 (3.22) 
 Interest Rates - Eurozone 2.38  (2.55) 
 
5.96 (3.08) 
 Climate Change 5.83  (2.16) 
 
6.25 (3.10) 
 
      European Union Responsibility 
     Economy 4.48  (1.86)   5.70 (2.70)   
Health Care 2.28  (1.96) 
 
4.72 (3.00) 
 Immigration 4.18  (2.28) 
 
6.00 (3.03) 
 Interest Rates - Non 
Eurozone 3.04  (3.32) 
 
5.26 (3.26) 
 Interest Rates - Eurozone 7.95  (2.10) 
 
6.29 (2.88) 
 Climate Change 5.50  (2.12) 
 
6.22 (3.03) 
  117 
  
27069 
  
n 
* Two-group mean comparison tests confirm there is a significant difference  
between citizens and experts for each policy area at p< .01. 
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Table 2: Multilevel Model of Correct Attributions of Responsibility    
 Null     Baseline  Full   
 Coef SE  Coef SE  Coef SE  
Political Knowledge    0.07 (.00) * 0.06 (.00) * 
EU Attitudes    0.09 (.01) * 0.07 (.01) * 
EU Attitudes^2    -0.16 (.01) * -0.15 (.01) * 
          
Control Variables          
Education       0.05 (.00) * 
Age       -0.002 (.00) * 
Female       -0.05 (.01) * 
Occupation (Base=Upper Service)        
Lower Service       -0.00 (.03)  
Petty Bourgeois       -0.05 (.02) * 
Routine Non-Manual       -0.08 (.03) * 
Skilled       -0.13 (.02) * 
Non-Skilled       -0.12 (.02) * 
Still in Education       0.03 (.03)  
Other       -0.03 (.02)  
          
Level 2 Variables          
Negative Media Tone   0.19 (.07) * 0.14 (.06) * 
Party Polarization    0.38 (.10) * 0.30 (.09) * 
Membership Length       0.005 (.00) * 
          
Intercept -2.76 (.06) * -3.42 (.12) * -3.38 (.11) * 
Variance 0.1 (.03)  0.05 (.01)  0.03 (.01)  
Number of 
individuals 
26662   26653   25596   
Number of contexts 28   28   28   
*p<.05, two-tailed test           
The dependent variable is closeness to expert evaluation.     
Source: European Election Study 2009 and Expert Survey 2010    
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Figure 1: Marginal Effect of EU Attitudes on Responsibility Judgments 
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I Question Wording from EES 2009 Voter Survey 
 
Political Knowledge 
Q92.  Switzerland is a member of the EU 
Q93.  The European Union has 25 member states 
Q94.  Every country in the EU elects the same number of representatives to the European Parliament. 
Q95.  Every six months, a different Member State becomes president of the Council of the European 
Union 
Q96.  The [Country] Minister of Education {or appropriate national title} is [Insert Name].  
Q97.  Individuals must be 25 or older to stand as candidates in [Country] general elections. 
Q98.  There are [actual number + 50%] members of the [Country] parliament. 
 
EU Attitudes 
Q79.  Generally speaking, do you think that [Country's] membership of the European Union is a good 
thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad? 
Q80.  Some say European Unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. 
What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
unification ‘has already gone too far’ and 10 means it ‘should be pushed further’. What number 
on this scale best describes your position? 
Q83.  In general, do you think that enlargement of the European Union would be a good thing, bad thing, 
or neither good nor bad? 
Q91.  How much confidence do you have that decisions made by the European Union will be in the 
interest of (country)? A great deal of confidence, a fair amount, not very much, or no confidence 
at all. 
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II  Descriptive Summary of the Data 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
     Individual-Level Variables 
    Closeness to Expert Evaluation -2.76 .98 -8.13 -0.12 
Political Knowledge 3.90 1.87 0 7 
EU Attitudes -0.01 0.73 -2.30 1.44 
Education 3.46 1.38 0 6 
Age 50.3 16.9 18 99 
Female .56 .50 0 1 
Upper Service .16 .36 0 1 
Lower Service .06 .24 0 1 
Routine Non-Manual .28 .45 0 1 
Petty Bourgeois .08 .27 0 1 
Skilled .11 .31 0 1 
Non-Skilled .16 .36 0 1 
Still in Education .04 .21 0 1 
Other .11 .31 0 1 
     Contextual-Level Variables 
    Negative Tone in Media 0.16 0.59 -1.36 1.26 
EU Party Polarization - SD 1.12 0.40 0.42 1.97 
Length of Membership 22.94 20.93 2 57 
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III  Country-Level Descriptive Data 
 
These figures show, for each policy area, the mean and standard deviation of expert and citizen 
attributions of responsibility to the EU by country. 
 
Economy   
 
Health Care 
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Immigration 
 
Interest Rates  
 
 
Climate Change 
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IV Distance to Country Experts 
Recall that the dependent variable looks at the closeness to average expert evaluation.  As a robustness 
check, we created an alternative dependent variable by calculating the distance between an individual’s 
attribution score and expert evaluations from his same country, rather than an overall average of all 
countries. For instance, a citizen from France is compared to the mean evaluation of experts from France.  
As the Table below shows, the results are substantively the same as in the original model (using grand 
mean expert evaluations). While there is between-country variation in expert and citizen judgments of 
responsibility, the results suggest that they are not systematic.  
 Multilevel Model of Correct Attributions of Responsibility       
 
Empty 
 
Baseline 
 
Full 
   Coef SE   Coef SE   Coef SE   
Political Knowledge 
   
0.09 (.00) * 0.07 (.00) * 
EU Attitudes 
   
0.08 (.01) * 0.06 (.01) * 
EU Attitudes^2 
   
-0.18 (.01) * -0.17 (.01) * 
          Control Variables 
         Education 
      
0.05 (.00) * 
Age 
      
0 (.00) * 
Female 
      
-0.06 (.02) * 
Occupation (Base=Upper Service) 
       Lower Service 
      
-0.04 (.04) 
 Petty Bourgeois 
      
-0.09 (.03) * 
Routine Non-Manual 
     
-0.07 (.03) * 
Skilled 
      
-0.18 (.03) * 
Non-Skilled 
      
-0.19 (.03) * 
Still in Education 
      
-0.05 (.04) 
 Other 
      
-0.09 (.03) * 
          Level 2 Variables 
         Negative Media Tone 
   
0.11 (.09) 
 
0.05 (.07) 
 Party Polarization 
   
0.54 (.14) * 0.57 (..13) * 
          Intercept -2.87 (.08) * -3.7 (.16) * -3.7 (.16) * 
Variance 0.16 (.04) 
 
0.08 (.01) 
 
0.08 (.01) 
 Number of individuals 26236 
  
26228 
  
25187 
  Number of contexts 28     28     28     
 *p<.05 , two-tailed test 
         The dependent variable is closeness to country expert evaluation. 
Source: European Election Study 2009 and Expert Survey 2010 
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V Attributions of Responsibility – EU Only 
Recall that the dependent variable looks at the closeness to average expert evaluation combining 
attributions to national governments and to the EU. In the models below, the dependent variable look at 
closeness to expert average for the EU responsibility questions only. The model output is the same in 
substance and significance to those in the paper, highlighting the robustness of the results. 
Multilevel Model of Correct Attributions of Responsibility: EU Only    
 Null   Baseline   Full   
 Coef SE  Coef SE  Coef SE  
Political Knowledge    0.09 (.00) * 0.07 (.00) * 
EU Attitudes    0.06 (.01) * 0.04 (.01) * 
EU Attitudes^2    -0.20 (.01) * -0.19 (.01) * 
          
Control Variables          
Education       0.06 (.00) * 
Age       -0.002 (.00) * 
Female       -0.08 (.02) * 
Occupation (Base=Upper Service)        
Lower Service       -0.02 (.04)  
Petty Bourgeois       -0.07 (.02) * 
Routine Non-Manual       -0.08 (.03) * 
Skilled       -0.17 (.03) * 
Non-Skilled       -0.18 (.03) * 
Still in Education       -0.04 (.04)  
Other       -0.06 (.03)  
          
Level 2 Variables          
Negative Media Tone   0.18 (.08) * 0.13 (.07)  
Party Polarization    0.28 (.12) * 0.21 (.10) * 
Membership Length       0.004 (.00) * 
          
Intercept -2.82 (.06)  -3.42 (.14) * -3.37 (.13) * 
Variance 0.1 (.03)  0.05 (.02)  0.04 (.01)  
Number of individuals 26236   26228   25187   
Number of contexts 28   28   28   
*p<.05, two-tailed test         
The dependent variable is closeness to expert evaluation.     
Source: European Election Study 2009 and Expert Survey 2010    
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VI Attributions of Responsibility: Relative Responsibility of the EU 
 compared to National Government 
In the 2009 EES Voter Survey, the questions asking respondents to assign responsibility to their national 
governments and the EU were asked sequentially; hence it is possible that citizens thought of their 
responses in terms of relative responsibility. To check of this would make a difference to our findings, we 
did additional analyses using relative responsibility as a dependent variable. First, we calculated the 
relative responsibility of the EU compared to national governments by comparing the scores given to each 
level of government: is it more, less, or equally responsible for each policy area. Next, this was compared 
to expert judgments and citizens were given one point for each “correct” answer. The distribution of this 
variable is below. 
 
Score n % 
0 2,758 10 
1 4,218 16 
2 7,565 28 
3 7,562 28 
4 4,293 16 
5 673 2 
 
We estimated this multilevel model using both linear regression and ordinal logit. As shown in the table 
below, the results are substantively and significantly the same as the original models, highlighting the 
robustness of the results.  
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Multilevel Model of Correct Attributions of Responsibility: Relative Responsibility of EU 
        
 
Linear Regression 
  
Ordinal Logit Regression 
 
Coef SE     Coef SE   
Political Knowledge 0.09 (.00) * 
 
0.13 (.01) * 
EU Attitudes 0.06 (.01) * 
 
0.09 (.02) * 
EU Attitudes^2 -0.03 (.01) * 
 
-0.05 (.02) * 
 
       Control Variables 
       Education 0.07 (.01) * 
 
0.11 (.01) * 
Age -0.01 (.00) * 
 
-0.01 (.00) * 
Female -0.06 (.00) * 
 
-0.08 (.02) * 
Occupation (Base=Upper Service) 
      Lower Service 0.02 (.04) 
  
0.02 (.05) 
 Petty Bourgeois 0.00 (.02) 
  
0.02 (.04) 
 Routine Non-Manual 
-0.01 (.03) 
  
0.00 (.05) 
 Skilled -0.05 (.03) 
  
-0.08 (.05) 
 Non-Skilled -0.04 (.03) 
  
-0.04 (.04) 
 Still in Education -0.13 (.04) 
  
-0.20 (.06) * 
Other -0.11 (.03) 
  
-0.16 (.05) * 
 
       Level 2 Variables 
       Negative Media Tone 0.22 (.11) * 
 
0.35 (.02) * 
Party Polarization 0.38 (.17) * 
 
0.44 (.03) * 
Membership Length -0.01 (.00) 
  
-0.01 (.00) * 
Constant 1.78 (.20) * 
    Cut 1 
    
-1.70 (.08) * 
Cut 2 
    
-0.50 (.08) * 
Cut 3 
    
0.85 (.08) * 
Cut 4 
    
2.34 (.08) * 
Cut 5 
    
4.61 (.09) * 
        Variance 0.12 (.03) 
  
0.25 -(.01) 
 
        Number of individuals 25970 
   
25970 
  Number of contexts 28       28     
*p<.05, two-tailed test 
     The dependent variable is the number of policy areas for which citizens correctly attributed relative 
responsibility. 
 Source: European Election Study 2009 and Expert Survey 2010 
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VII Bivariate relationship between dependent variable  
 and political knowledge 
 
Due to the large number of observations (nearly 27000), we present here a sunflower plot and box plot to 
help visualize the relationship between political knowledge and correct attributions of responsibility 
Sunflower plot of political knowledge and dependent variable 
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Box plot of political knowledge groups and dependent variable 
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